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Abstract 
Purpose – This paper explores how social accounting operates in the context of profound political, 
social and economic crises. Specifically, it examines how companies constructed strategies of 
action to produce and organise social accounting practices under different socio-political and 
economic contexts prior to and after the Arab Spring. 
Design/methodology/approach – The paper draws on Swidler’s theory of “Culture Toolkit” and 43 
semi-structured interviews with 17 firms and their stakeholders in the Arab region. 
Findings – The study argues that context influences social accounting practices by shaping a 
cultural toolkit of habits, skills and styles from which companies develop their social accounting 
related strategies of action. During “settled” periods, companies draw on resources to develop their 
social accounting practices whilst they seek knowledge and feedback on boundaries and 
expectations of the socio-political and economic contexts. During “unsettled” periods, companies 
begin to adopt highly organised meaning systems (i.e. ideologies) from which new ways and 
methods of social accounting practices are deployed. 
Originality/value – The paper contributes to the extant literature by providing insights into social 
accounting practices in the under-explored context of the profound political, social and economic 
crises that followed the Arab Spring. In addition, we introduce Swidler’s Culture Toolkit theory 
to the accounting literature. 
Keywords Arab Spring, Context, Culture toolkit, Social accounting, Crisis 
Paper type Research paper 
 
1. Introduction 
Prior research on social accounting was mostly carried out in the context of developed 
countries, which have experienced a relatively stable socio-political environment (see for e.g. 
Gray et al., 1995; Deegan, 2017; Beattie, 2014). Within such research contexts, organisations 
and industries might have encountered a degree of disruption, but the wider political, social 
and economic environments of most of these countries have remained relatively stable since 
the Second World War. Such political and social stability is less often the case in developing 
countries, which have been more prone to revolution, civil war and other types of profound 
political and social crises. Whilst social accounting research has been conducted in 
developing countries that exhibit somewhat unstable environments (see for e.g. Belal and 
Owen, 2015; Kamla, 2007; Belal et al., 2013), little is known about how social accounting 
operates in the context of profound political, social and economic crises. 
We address this issue by exploring how social accounting changed in the period prior to and 
after the Arab Spring. According to the Oxford Dictionary, the Arab Spring was “a process 
or period of political or cultural liberalization in the Arab world ... a series of anti-government 
or pro-democratic uprisings and demonstrations in various countries in North Africa and the 
Middle East, beginning in Tunisia in December 2010” (OED, 2019). This event has changed 
political regimes to various extents in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, 
leading to political and economic transitions and changes in public sentiment (WEF, 2016). 
The Arab Spring, thus changed institutions, contexts and other forms of socioeconomic 
structures in the MENA region (Malik and Awadallah, 2013). Our specific research question 
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is “how did Arab companies construct strategies of action to produce and organise social 
accounting practices prior to and after the Arab Spring?” 
Drawing on Swidler’s (1986) Culture Toolkit theory (CTT), we conceptualise social 
accounting as strategies of action. Originating from sociology, Swidler’s theory has been 
employed by a range of studies to comprehend corporate behaviours and decision-making 
processes (e.g. Fine and Hallett, 2014; Leonardi, 2011). In this paper, we explore how culture 
can play different roles in influencing and shaping strategies of action in the settled period 
prior to the Arab Spring, and the unsettled period after the Arab Spring. We find these 
concepts beneficial in clarifying the tacit nature of the complex relationships between the 
companies and their stakeholders and the role social accounting plays in revealing or 
obscuring those relationships. 
This study includes 17 Arab companies and their stakeholders via 43 semi-structured 
interviews. The companies comprise a sample located in four countries in the MENA region: 
Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan and Morocco. These countries and their people have a strong, shared 
sense of culture and history, which is influenced by the region’s complex socio-political 
landscape. Following the Arab Spring, companies in the region embarked on a process of 
justifying their existence after a key political and economic stakeholder disappeared from 
their corporate management and ownership structures (i.e. the political and economic 
connections with the previous state regimes) (Diwan et al., 2013). The context within which 
social accounting was practised underwent a profound transformation, which included 
changes in key stakeholder relationships (e.g. with governments, head of states and NGOs) 
and their power and influence in society (Malik and Awadallah, 2013). 
Our study provides both empirical and theoretical contributions. The principal contribution 
of this study lies in the examination of a rich empirical site – the Arab Spring and its 
associated unstable context. We respond to the call for contextual studies (see Tilt, 2016, 
2018) by examining an under-researched but empirically rich context. Prior social accounting 
studies (see for example Gray et al., 1995; Deegan, 2017; Beattie, 2014) were conducted in 
a relatively stable context. Our examination of the Arab Spring context, which went through 
significant socio-political crises, has enabled us to report some new empirical findings which 
includes, inter alia, social accounting practices to be led by a bottom-up approach in post-
Arab Spring with “emancipatory” potential (Osman et al., 2020). Under such circumstances, 
social disclosures are perceived as either irrelevant due to broken trust in the companies, or 
inappropriate, having negative impacts on the companies due to being out of line with the 
contextual changes taking place. We argue that these findings are quite unique to the context 
under examination. They stand in contrast with the previous findings in the social accounting 
literature (see for e.g. Campbell, 2000; Cho, 2009; Patten, 1992; Strand, 2013). 
Theoretically, in our endeavour for understanding social accounting in the unstable context 
of the Arab Spring, we found Swidler useful in that it helped to shed light on the importance 
of context, and of linkages between culture and context, in developing our understanding of 
social accounting. Doing so enabled us to introduce a new theoretical framework to the social 
accounting literature. We thus respond to recent calls in this literature to use previously 
untried theories from other interdisciplinary fields (see for e.g. Thoradeniya et al., 2015; 
Unerman and Chapman, 2014). Examining the development of social accounting in the 
profoundly unstable context of the Arab Spring allows us to explore how companies mobilise 
social accounting as strategies of action to produce and organise their social accounting 
practices under different contextual settings – pre- and post-Arab Spring. Drawing on Swidler 
(1986), we categorise these two periods as settled and unsettled contexts respectively. During 
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these two periods, we observe that in the process of constructing various strategies of action 
different ideologies are at play and identify different configurations in the cultural toolkit of 
habits, skills and styles. We also argue that the whole social accounting exercise and the 
related dynamics are, in turn, influenced by the surrounding social, political and economic 
contexts in which companies operate. Our analysis enables identification of how meaning 
systems (i.e. ideologies) are deployed in shaping social accounting in different contexts. We 
distinguished between (1) a settled period where ideologies can go underground to pervade 
social accounting practices and gradually blend to create “what is true”, and (2) an unsettled 
period in which ideologies can play more complex roles in shaping and constructing social 
accounting. Finally, we contribute to the wider social accounting literature through providing 
an understanding of how companies respond to contextual changes by configuring different 
cultural tools at their disposal. This understanding reveals that companies adapt to contextual 
heterogeneity. 
In the next section, we explain the theoretical framework adopted in this study, followed by 
a discussion of prior research in section three. The fourth section of the paper describes the 
research methods adopted in this study, including data sources and data analysis methods. 
The fifth section reports the key findings of this study under two broad theoretical categories 
– the settled and unsettled contexts of the Arab Spring. We discuss our findings in section 
six, and section seven provides concluding remarks as well as future research directions. 
2. Using Swidler’s framework to understand social accounting under changing 
contexts 
CTT framing is based on a broader literature in cultural sociology and contains pivotal 
assumptions about the extent to which culture influences action (i.e. Weberian social action) 
by providing widely accepted values towards which action is directed (Geertz, 1973; 
Keesing, 1974; Hannerz, 1969). Swidler suggests that this relation between culture [1] and 
action is formed via, what she describes as, a “toolkit”. The term toolkit refers to a repertoire 
of habits, skills and styles (i.e. tools for solving practical problems and navigating their 
environment) from which one can construct “strategies of action”, which Swidler (1986) 
defines as “ways of ordering action through time” (p. 227). 
We conceptualise social accounting as strategies of action, which comprise scaffolding for 
companies to create and organise different social accounting practices. For instance, 
companies trying to establish political and economic positions within the pre-Arab Spring 
regimes would associate themselves with politically connected NGOs, prestigious social 
programmes, and signal their loyalty and devotion to those authoritarian regimes. In such a 
context, certain choices made sense, whilst specific culturally shaped styles, skills and habits 
were seen to be advantageous. Construction of these strategies can be stimulated by 
ideologies and requires different configurations of the cultural toolkit depending on the 
context in question – settled and unsettled. Table 1 summarises and clarifies the key terms of 
our theoretical framing. Swidler argues that actions should be integrated into larger 
assemblages, calling them “strategies of action” (Swidler, 1986, p. 276). Culture and cultural 
structures such as socio-political and economic contexts play key roles in shaping human 
capacities, which are then used to construct these strategies of action. Swidler uses the term 
“strategy” here in an unconventional sense, referring to a general method of producing and 
organising action, through which several goals can be reached [2]. Therefore, strategies of 
action incorporate and depend on practices, attitudes, awareness and views of the world 
(Swidler, 1986). Further, Swidler suggests that to examine culture’s underlying effects, the 
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focus should not be on the action itself but rather on the “strategies of action”, which comprise 
of persistent ways of organising and producing action through time. Here, Swidler sees the 
importance of culture’s impacts not so much in defining the final action but rather in 
providing the cultural/contextual components that are used to construct “strategies of action”. 
This conceptualisation of culture conceives of institutions and contexts as cultural structures, 
which “play a key role in accounting for the systematicity of action” (Lizardo and Strand, 
2010, p. 206). This view suggests that context and its socio-political and economic layers are 
the means through which a group of people are able to share and accept one another’s social 
practices and behaviours. Swidler argued that cultural influence on action differed under what 
she called “settled” and “unsettled” contexts. We provide detailed explanations of these two 
conceptual categories below. 
2.1 Identifying the settled context [3] 
Settled contexts orient and direct, to a higher degree, corporate practices through pre-
established “strategies of action”. Those, on one hand, are constructed and operationalised 
by companies which are able to gain and maintain access to a required toolkit of skills, habits 
and styles within a socio-political and economic environment. On the other hand, the 
practices produced and organised via these strategies of action require a low-level of 
justifications to validate their compatibility with different socio-political and economic 
structures within the wider environment. These toolkits are maintained and refined – under 
such environments – from which companies can construct strategies of action that create and 
maintain stability and continuity. Here, culture combined with the pre-Arab Spring socio-
political and economic context to simultaneously seem too fused and too detached. The latter 
can be exemplified in the disconnect between reporting and practice on the ground. This 
simultaneous fusion and detachment between culture and context can be elucidated via what 
Swidler called an ideology – highly organised, articulated meaning regimes (e.g. political 
and religious) – which can be “adapted to varied life circumstances” (Swidler, 1986, p. 281). 
However, ideologies are adapted to pervade social accounting practices to enable gradual 
blending into coherent “assumptions about what is true” (Swidler, 1986, p. 281). 
We conceive of the pre-Arab Spring period (i.e. the time-period before December 2010) 
as a settled context. Understanding the pre-Arab Spring as a settled context requires 
consideration of key aspects of the historical, socio-political and economic context of the 
MENA region. The region consists of postcolonial states, which acted as the principal 
economic players in key sectors (e.g. food, energy, housing, health and other public services) 
(Breisinger et al., 2011). The dominant economic structures helped facilitate and support the 
emergence of three distinct classes in the society: (1) the ruling elites, (2) the ruling elites’ 
clienteles and (3) the ordinary citizens (Haddad, 2011). This system had endured for over 50 
years despite the changing political and economic ideologies of the region (socialism 1960–
1970 and neo-liberal economic reform during 1990s – Harrigan, 2011).  
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Swidler’s 
key 
terms 
Swidler’s 
concepts 
Operationalisation 
Our 
definitions 
Settled context  Unsettled context  
Culture A ‘tool kit’ of 
habits, skills & 
styles. 
(Swidler, 1986, 
p273). 
The available 
set of culturally 
situated habits, 
skills & styles 
that companies 
can draw from 
 Here cultural 
influences 
show low 
coherence & 
consistency. 
 In the 
unsettled 
context, 
culture 
provides 
greater 
coherence. 
Habits, 
skills & 
styles 
Tools & 
abilities, which 
people use “in 
varying 
configurations 
to solve 
different kind 
of problems”. 
(Swidler, 1986, 
p273) 
Available 
resources 
including tools 
and abilities, 
which 
companies can 
use to construct 
their strategies 
of action.   
 Companies 
seek to 
maintain & 
refine existing 
skills, habits 
and styles of 
acting. 
 E.g., refining a 
toolkit of 
corporate 
communication 
skills, social 
involvements 
habits & 
political 
connections 
styles. 
 Companies 
seek to 
identify and 
adopt new 
skills, habits 
and styles. 
 E.g., 
disregarding 
unsuitable 
pre-Arab 
Spring styles 
and habits of 
handling and 
reporting 
charity work.   
 E.g., 
adopting new 
skills that are 
identified in 
the 
employees’ 
initiatives.   
Strategies 
of action 
Persistent ways 
of organising & 
producing 
action over 
time. (Swidler, 
1986) 
Social 
accounting, 
which 
comprises 
scaffoldings 
that can be 
used by 
companies to 
create and 
organise social 
accounting 
practices. 
 Constructing 
strategies of 
action that 
create and 
maintain 
stability and 
continuity for 
the company.  
 Constructing 
new 
strategies 
that suit the 
survival of 
emerging 
ideologies 
around but 
also beyond 
their social 
accounting. 
Action Weberian 
social action - 
"an action is 
'social' if the 
acting 
individual 
takes account 
Practices of 
social 
accounting: for 
example 
corporate 
decisions on 
undertaking & 
 Implicit and 
weak influence 
of culture over 
action. 
 Explicit and 
strong 
influence of 
culture over 
action. 
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of the 
behaviour of 
others and is 
thereby 
oriented in its 
course". 
(Weber, 1978) 
disclosing non-
economic 
activities, 
including 
various social 
& 
environmental 
activities.  
Context Cultural 
structures, 
which play key 
roles in 
creating the 
systematicity 
of action 
(Lizardo and 
Strand, 2010). 
Also the wider 
socio-political 
and economic 
environment. 
This can be 
categorised 
into both 
settled and 
unsettled 
contexts 
(Swidler, 
1986). 
We 
operationalise 
the pre-Arab 
Spring period 
(i.e. the time-
period before 
December 
2010) as a 
settled context, 
and post-Arab 
Spring as an 
unsettled 
context (i.e. the 
time-period 
from 2011 and 
onward). 
 Pre-Arab 
Spring: context 
is dominant 
over culture. 
 Post-Arab 
Spring: 
culture 
dominates 
over context. 
Ideology  “Articulated, 
highly 
organized 
meaning 
systems” 
(Swidler, 1986, 
p278) 
Self-conscious, 
multi-layered 
meaning 
systems of 
corporate 
management 
(both political 
and religious). 
It also includes 
political 
ideology of pre 
and post Arab 
Spring regimes 
such as neo-
liberalism and 
socialism. 
 Elitist ideology, 
an implicit, 
authoritative, 
giving 
perceptions 
about what is 
true. 
 Leaving no 
room for 
competition 
from alternative 
ideologies. 
 Religious 
and 
egalitarian 
ideologies, 
these are 
explicit, 
articulated 
and highly 
organised, 
which 
encourages 
new 
strategies of 
action. 
 Allowing 
competitions 
from 
alternative 
ideologies. 
Table 1: Overview of key Conceptual terms in CTT and their operationalisation in the settled 
and unsettled contexts 
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This economic regime created a weak private sector, which contributed less than 1% of 
the world non-fuel exports, compared to 10% in East Asia. The Arab private sector is 
dominated by family enterprises. Only a minority portion of their ventures has been floated 
on the stock markets (Diwan et al., 2013). Those private enterprises are owned and controlled 
by two classes of local families: (1) ordinary families who inherited their business – mainly 
small and medium enterprises – and managed to survive the political and economic changes 
and (2) influential families (e.g. Trabelsi family of Tunisia, Ahmed Ezz of Egypt and Rami 
Makhlouf of Syria) who owned the larger size businesses and were affiliated to the state 
(Haddad, 2011). Within the latter enterprises, the state-business relationship is typically one 
that is personalised rather than institutionalised, where the sovereigns of the state and 
business owners are coupled through exclusive, often familial, networks. These 
arrangements, therefore, are normally manifested via a shadow economy controlled by the 
military (Diwan et al., 2013). Nevertheless, the common characteristics of these internal Arab 
markets were (1) (a vital economic stake) controlled by the military and (2) subjects of 
interest for both economic and political powers. 
2.2 Identifying the unsettled context 
An unsettled context represents a “period of social transformation [that] provides 
simultaneously the best and worst evidence for culture’s influence on social action” (Swidler, 
1986, p. 278). As pre-existing context is “taken for granted” to shape and justify the adopted 
action, a search for alternatives takes place in society to organise and produce new strategies 
of action (Swidler, 1986). In such settings, new strategies of action are established through 
ideology. The establishment of these ideologies is initiated by changing what used to be the 
quiescent contextual patterns during the settled times with crucial meanings resulting in 
group division and bouts of ideological groupings or re-groupings (Swidler, 1986). The 
unsettledness of this period stems from those unprecedented changes that occurred in the 
sociopolitical and economic context and began to dismantle as its supporting influential 
actors lost their power. In this context, we argue that learning new ways to organise social 
accounting was a necessity for the companies, as they engaged in practicing unfamiliar habits 
to become familiar (Swidler, 1986). Ideologies have powerful influences in this conceptual 
category, but in a restricted sense. Rather than providing the underlying assumptions of an 
entire way of social accounting, they make explicit demands in selected contested areas. 
These restrictions stem from the fact that ideological movements such as the Arab Spring are 
not complete cultures, as much of their postulated understanding of the world is influenced 
by pre-existing cultural patterns (Swidler, 1986). The notions of culture, strategies of action, 
ideology, settled and unsettled context in Swidler’s framework allow us to explain how 
companies frame social accounting to construct different strategies of action in dealing with 
the contextual changes such as Arab Spring by having different configurations of cultural 
toolkit at their disposal for dealing with a new situation. 
We conceive of the post-Arab Spring period as an unsettled context (i.e. the time-period 
from 2011 onwards). The dominant state and weak private sector resulted in a number of 
political and economic drivers that fuelled the Arab Spring to varying degrees. This led to 
issues of poverty, lack of education and economic growth, where the region failed to achieve 
an acceptable reduction in the unemployment rates and improve the living standards of 
ordinary citizens. The Arab world had become more educated, younger and gender gaps had 
decreased. In contrast, the number of people living under the poverty line in the Arab region 
had increased, at a time when global poverty figures were declining (Cammett et al., 2018). 
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Although a limited number of studies have attempted to provide an explanation for the 
Arab Spring movements (see for e.g. Campante and Chor, 2012 and Malik and Awadallah, 
2013), two groups of studies can be distinguished in explaining the underlying circumstances 
that set the stage of the Arab Spring. A group using economic reasoning argued that Arab 
Spring movements were triggered by the failure of both government and the private sector in 
providing employment to the Arab population (Malik and Awadallah, 2013). Another group 
saw the revolutions as a call for political freedom fuelled by the absence of democracy and 
press freedom, in addition to the existence of corrupt Arab regimes that had spent decades in 
power (Campante and Chor, 2012). In this paper, we argue that Arab Spring is a conflation 
of all of these factors noted above. 
3. Social accounting and the influence of context 
There is a growing, but limited body of work in the social accounting literature, looking at 
various contextual elements (e.g. cultural, political, economic, religions and history) in 
relation to the practices of social accounting and reporting (see for example, Kamla, 2007; 
Karam and Jamali, 2013; Killian and O’Regan, 2016). As noted by Tilt (2016), the contexts 
in which social accounting is examined become rather important to understand its 
predominantly voluntary nature, allowing researchers to examine the motives and processes 
of (de)implementing such practices. On a similar note, Jamali and Karam (2018) stated that 
the nuanced and multifaceted practices of social accounting are contextualised and locally 
formed by multi-level factors (e.g. ownership, structure, governance mission, identity and 
culture) and actors (e.g. governments, political elites and factions, local firms and 
multinational corporations) rooted within broader formal and informal governance regimes. 
This body of literature, however, remains limited, as less attention has been given to the 
conditions and state of contexts, assuming that sociopolitical and economic environments 
and their components are rather static or predefined. We argue that context and its stability 
are dynamic in this field of study. Thus, we address how the stability and different states of 
the context affect social accounting by drawing on Swidler’s (1986) two cultural models that 
distinguish between settled and unsettled contexts, facilitating a nuanced and detailed 
analysis. 
We position our study within this social accounting literature as an approach that looks 
beyond the economic interactions between organisations and society (see for e.g. Owen, 
2008; Gray, 2002, 2013). Jamali and Karam (2018) highlight the significance of examining 
the context-dependency of social accounting practices by paying closer attention to peculiar 
institutional patterns and national system configurations of developing countries. Following 
this, our focus is on social accounting practices under the Arab Spring context. Noting the 
strong significance of the Arab Spring context (Karam and Jamali, 2013), we distinguish 
between two different periods where social accounting was practised: prior to and after the 
Arab Spring. We seek to understand the contextual dynamics of each period and how 
companies construct their strategies of action [4], in relation to social accounting. 
Studies of social accounting in the MENA region have identified a number of contextual 
“localised” factors which have capacity to influence social accounting practices and/or 
perceptions in the region (see for e.g. Kamla, 2007; Jamali and Mirshak, 2007; Kamla et al., 
2012; Osman et al., 2020). The nature of these factors revolves around ideological views 
stemming from religious and nationalist perspectives, as well as the shared colonisation 
history and socio-political setting. These contextual factors either create a structurally 
vigorous environment, where different ways and methods can be used to practice social 
accounting, or leave a gap for personal discretion, hindsight and initiative to shape these 
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practices (Jamali and Mirshak, 2007; Kamla, 2007). Simultaneously, these dynamics paved 
the way for global principles and standards to remain a key influential force in shaping the 
wider picture of social accounting in the settled MENA region (Kamla et al., 2006). This 
seems to result from the desires of relatively influential decision-makers within the political 
and economic regimes of the region. Drawing on contextual appreciation of colonial, 
economic, political and cultural forces, Osman et al. (2020) highlighted the “emancipatory” 
and “repressive” potentials of social accounting. However, these localised dynamics appeared 
to confine social accounting practices to a limited area, such as philanthropic activities, whilst 
the context of these developing countries is blurring wider dimensions of such practices. 
Particularly, practices in social accounting such as disclosures are mobilised to portray 
nationalistic and religious views, guiding businesses in integrating the local Islamic and 
political perspectives in their planning, objectives and decisions. 
The wider socio-political and economic issues were essential components in studies 
undertaken in the MENA region (see for e.g. Kamla et al., 2012; Karam and Jamali, 2013). 
The perceptions, for example, around social accounting in the region were influenced by the 
development of local socio-economic and political contexts, specifically, imperialism/ 
colonialism, globalisation and cultural specificities (Kamla et al., 2012; Osman et al., 2020). 
Karam and Jamali (2013) extended this argument to include the state of the context and its 
stability to argue that instability of the local context coupled with global pressures for change 
provides an opportunity for the private sector to mobilise practices of social accounting as a 
particular tool of institutional work in favour of change. Therefore, socio-political context 
may shape perceptions around social accounting and its practices via: (1) the localised 
religious teaching, which emphasises the social and environmental responsibilities, and (2) 
the local, political and economic regimes, which can promote, facilitate and regulate different 
aspects of accounting (Kamla et al., 2012). However, the [in] stability of this context may 
produce a ground for influencing change in social accounting practices. Karam and Jamali 
(2013) argued that practices can be further de-institutionalised when pressures for change 
accompanied by contextual instability fomented through the Arab Spring. 
The effects of such relatively settled contexts, therefore, can range from shaping the nature 
and extent of social accounting practices, to influencing the accountants’ perceptions of such 
practices. Here, the multifaceted layers of the settled context can also blur particular 
dimensions of social accounting, whilst empowering specific individuals or groups who can 
(de)implement ways/methods of practicing social accounting. Although Karam and Jamali 
(2013) suggested that the Arab Spring (i.e. unsettled context) facilitated change at 
institutional levels, prior studies have not explored the practices of social accounting under 
such conditions of instability. We address this area in our study from Swidler’s point of view, 
where a conflation of cultural and contextual factors determine to what extent and how 
companies choose to construct different means of practising social accounting. 
4. Research method 
The primary research in this study involves a range of semi-structured interviews with key 
stakeholders from inside and outside the Arab private sectors, located in four countries in the 
MENA region: Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan and Morocco [5]. The interviewees were chosen to 
capture a wide range of perspectives, including those who remained outside the social 
accounting process, and those who were impacted only indirectly. All interviewees were 
offered anonymity. 
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We included those interviewees who were (1) senior managers, (2) involved in social 
accounting practices, and (3) employed in a company that operates in the Arab region and 
engaged in social accounting practices. Invitations were sent to those who fitted the 
abovementioned criteria and whose contact details could be obtained. In all, 22 senior 
managers were interviewed. All the interviews were conducted in Arabic language, the 
mother-tongue of the interviewees and the principal researcher. The majority of the 
interviews were conducted via Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) such as Skype and Zoom, 
permitting a range of features that enhanced the interactive nature of the interviews such as 
screen, document and text sharing and the ability to present PowerPoint slides. The 
interviews lasted between 45 and 135 min and, in total, just over 1740 min of corporate 
interviews were collated. Further information regarding these interviews is presented in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Details of corporate interviewees 
 
In order to pursue the opportunity to interact with as many stakeholders with social 
accounting related/Arab Spring related knowledge as possible, invitations were sent to senior 
staff in four types of organisations (NGOs, Media, Consultancy and Education and training) 
that have or had direct relations with the 17 companies we examined. They were contacted 
via email, social media and phone, as well as a public invitation which was posted on social 
media. Although over 50 people responded directly to the invitations, 21 people were 
Position Industry Gender Country Date  Length 
(minutes) 
Code 
Executive Officer Construction Male  Egypt 12/11/16 48 ES1 
Executive Officer Banking Male  Egypt 09/12/16 68 ES2 
Non-Executive 
Director 
Banking  Male  Egypt 15/07/16 92 ES3 
Executive Officer Aluminum Male  Egypt 29/10/16 46 ES4 
Chief Executive 
Officer 
Insurance Female  Egypt 05/06/16 50 ES5 
Operating Officer Banking Male  Egypt 24/05/16 109 ES6 
Operating Officer Telecommunication Male  Egypt 07/06/16 52 ES7 
Financial Officer Logistics Male  Tunisia 30/09/16 55 TS1 
Executive Officer Banking Female  Tunisia 13/11/16 130 TS2 
Financial Officer Aviation Male  Tunisia 28/05/16 103 TS3 
Company Secretary Banking Male  Tunisia 06/06/16 48 TS4 
Non-Executive 
Director 
Banking Female  Tunisia 12/12/16 45 TS5 
Company Secretary Banking Male  Jordan  15/06/16 89 JS1 
Operating Officer Telecommunication Male  Jordan  20/07/16 115 JS2 
Operating Officer Telecommunication Male  Jordan  21/10/16 75 JS3 
Non-Executive 
Director 
Banking Male  Jordan  28/10/16 66 JS4 
Executive Officer Insurance Male  Jordan  17/09/16 120 JS5 
Executive Officer Logistics Male  Morocco  22/09/16 70 MS1 
Company Secretary Financial Female  Morocco  08/11/16 63 MS2 
Operating Officer Insurance Male  Morocco  05/11/16 135 MS3 
Financial Officer Construction Female  Morocco  21/11/16 101 MS4 
Executive Officer Financial Male  Morocco  03/08/16 60 MS5 
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available for interviews and fit our abovementioned criteria. 17 of them were interviewed via 
VoIP and 4 via face-to-face, resulting in 1,120 min of stakeholder interviews. Further 
information regarding the stakeholder interviewees is presented in Table 3. 
As can be seen from Tables 2 and 3, all interviews were conducted in 2016. However, all of 
our interviewees were experienced enough to comment on the state of affairs both pre- and 
post-Arab Spring. Only one interviewee was an exception because he moved to a new 
organisation during this period. In order to ensure factual accuracy, we have cross checked 
interview data with other corporate and media reports where possible. 
The corporate interviews covered two major sections: first a generic section invited 
interviewees to talk about (1) their roles and experiences in their organisations, and (2) the 
post-Arab spring state of social accounting and its practices in comparison with their preArab 
Spring counterparts. The second section was primarily based on social accounting materials 
produced by the company and news articles. The stakeholder interviews were similarly 
structured. They contained generic and detailed sections that focused on changes in social 
accounting for the company in question. The interviews were originally transcribed in Arabic. 
Subsequently, the entire Arabic transcripts were initially coded and analysed thematically 
using NVivo (Miles et al., 2013). This was then strengthened manually by several careful 
and close reading of the transcripts. We have only translated selected extracts from Arabic 
into English for the quotes reported in this paper. This has helped us in doing justice to the 
richness of the original Arabic data and minimised the risk of losing that richness in the 
process of translation (Evans, 2004; Spence et al., 2017). 
  
 
Table 3. Details of stakeholder interviewees 
Position Company Gender Country Date  Length (minutes) Code 
Director NGO Male  Egypt 21/10/16 32 EC1 
Business Correspondent Media Female  Egypt 17/11/16 45 EC2 
Professor Academic Male  Egypt 23/06/16 61 EC3 
Director Consultancy Male  Egypt 07/10/16 31 EC4 
Deputy Director  NGO Female  Egypt 14/05/16 33 EC5 
Director Consultancy Male  Tunisia  02/05/16 73 TC1 
Senior Executive NGO Male  Tunisia  16/05/16 35 TC2 
Researcher Consultancy Male  Tunisia  08/09/16 37 TC3 
Business Specialist  Media Female  Tunisia  22/10/16 87 TC4 
Professor Academic Male  Tunisia  06/05/16 69 TC5 
Marketing Director NGO Male  Jordan 15/05/16 32 JC1 
PR Director Consultancy Female  Jordan 20/11/16 30 JC2 
Director Consultancy Male  Jordan 24/05/16 59 JC3 
Researcher NGO Female  Jordan 28/06/16 77 JC4 
Senior Executive NGO Male  Jordan 29/09/16 50 JC5 
Associate Dean Academic Female  Jordan 06/10/16 44 JC6 
Chartered Accountant Consultancy Male  Jordan 26/08/16 80 JC7 
Deputy Director  NGO Male  Morocco 31/08/16 47 MC1 
Professor Academic Female  Morocco 17/10/16 42 MC2 
Deputy Director  NGO Male  Morocco 14/10/16 90 MC3 
Business Correspondent Media Female  Morocco 30/10/16 67 MC4 
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In addition, we had an Arabic-speaking team member who conducted the interviews and 
was familiar with the history and culture of the Arab Spring regions. Moreover, the research 
team of this paper has significant experience of conducting research in non-English speaking 
fields. 
Following O’Dwyer (2004) and Miles et al. (2013), our data analysis involved a three-step 
process – data reduction, data display and conclusion gathering. Broadly, we have structured 
the data in accordance with the theoretical categories discussed in section two of this paper. 
The four strategies of action, which comprise scaffolding for companies to create and 
organise social accounting practices, are reported under each of the categories that emerged 
from the data analysis (NGOs’ partnerships, social involvements, stakeholder engagements 
and corporate communication). There were several iterations between telling (theorisation) 
and showing (display) of data before we finalised the findings reported in the next section 
(Golden-Biddle and Locke, 2007). 
 
5. Findings: social accounting practices in a settled vs an unsettled context 
In this section, we report findings related to the practice of social accounting prior to and 
subsequent to the Arab Spring. We refer to these periods as settled and unsettled contexts. 
We summarise our findings in Table 4 before discussing them in detail in Sections 5.1 and 
5.2. 
5.1 Social accounting in a settled context 
In describing this period, our focus is on identifying how the four social accounting areas: 
NGO partnerships, social involvements, stakeholder engagements and corporate 
communication (i.e. strategies of action), of companies, were constructed during the settled 
period (before December 2010). In this settled period, culture as opposed to the socio-
political and economic contexts can appear simultaneously too fused and too detached 
(Swidler, 1986). The latter situation exhibits when the socio-political and economic context 
does not provide clear and direct support to practise social accounting, whilst culture does 
(both tacit culture such as habits and styles, and explicit cultural materials such as rituals and 
beliefs) act in a supportive manner (Swidler, 1986). 
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Table 4. Social accounting practices under settled and unsettled context 
 
A discussion with a senior manager in Tunisia about the pre-2000 period and the ways in 
which different areas of social accounting were constructed, highlighted the issue of the 
socio-political and economic context in supporting such constructions: 
No one knew if exposing their social activities would be welcome, acceptable or even legal ... so 
whoever had engaged in these activities avoided reporting them publicly ... that was a risk no one 
would take ... as providing any accounts of that [social activity] was very risky ... the problem was 
not in having a reporting guideline but actually knowing your boundaries and the redlines (TS4, 
Tunisia). 
The disconnection between culture and context during this period is most apparent in the 
disconnect between the actions around social involvements and the communication of those 
actions. The contrast in constructing these areas of social accounting can be explained not 
only by this disconnection between culture and context, but also via what Swidler called an 
ideology that can be “adapted to varied life circumstances” (Swidler, 1986, p. 281). Ideology 
needs to be adapted to bridge between discontinuous strategies of actions. The above quote 
of TS4 also highlighted an ideology around risk management that had been adapted to deal 
with the complexity of the period and the discontinuity of associated corporate 
communications. The adapted ideology that surrounded the construction of these two 
strategies of action were about a classification of risk [a risk no one would take]. This type 
Social accounting 
practices 
Illustrations of the 
practice 
Settled Context Unsettled Context 
NGO partnerships Partnerships between Arab 
companies and local & 
global NGOs in Arab 
Spring countries. 
 Partnerships with 
selected NGOs based 
on their political 
connections. 
 Provided political 
boundaries & skills. 
 Based on efficiency & 
capabilities of an 
NGO. 
 Provided social access 
& mobilisation. 
Social involvements Projects funded & carried 
out partially or fully by 
Arab companies, 
concerned with specific 
social issues (e.g. health, 
education & youth 
employment).   
 Politically & globally 
engaged inputs. 
 Steered by influential 
NGOs that were linked 
to the political elites. 
 Less politically, but 
remained globally 
engaged inputs.  
 Steered by wider 
societies & their 
necessities.  
Stakeholder 
engagement 
Process adopted to involve 
different stakeholder 
groups in shaping social 
accounting (e.g. design, 
operation & 
communication). 
 Highly engaged with 
local political & 
economic elite groups. 
 Poorly engaged with 
less powerful 
stakeholders. 
 Highly engaged with 
newly empowered 
stakeholders (e.g., 
employees) to show 
disconnection with 
previous elite groups.    
Corporate 
communication 
Spaces concerned with 
external communications.   
 Highly engaged with 
global guidelines  
 Politically influenced 
as to portraying loyalty 
& devotion to pre 
Arab Spring 
‘authoritarian’ 
regimes.  
 Still to some extent 
engaged with global 
guidelines. 
 Involved in Arab 
Spring 
 Held explicit cultural 
materials.   
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of risk (of getting caught by the surveillance regime of the authoritarian state) stemmed from 
uncertainty surrounding the contextual consequences of such practices [no one knew if 
exposing their social activities would be welcome, acceptable or seen as legal]. Under such 
circumstances when companies engaged in social accounting, we argue that strategies of 
action are constructed via a culturally-shaped toolkit consisting of skills, habits and styles. In 
our context, the toolkit is a set of skills of knowing what the surrounding social issues are, 
how companies can be involved, and how these issues can be addressed using appropriate 
styles (see Tables 1 and 4). 
An interviewee (TS5, Tunisia) referred to a change in the context [... this started to change 
after 2000 when NGOs and charities began to emerge], where practising social accounting 
became more contextually acceptable [... things became rather easier]. The period (after 
2000) was dominated by a neo-liberal ideology, where the formalisation and operation of 
global NGOs and charities were permitted by the head of states (Malik and Awadallah, 2013). 
This change helped in overcoming the main issue that social accounting faced before 2000 
[the problem was not in having a reporting guideline but actually knowing your boundaries 
and the redlines] (TS4, Tunisia). This reformed context began to support different areas of 
social accounting through the introduction of these NGOs, which had brought global skills, 
habits and styles (e.g. communications skills, involvements and connections styles), as well 
as local political connections. These contextually shaped skills, habits and styles invited an 
alteration of the previous toolkit. A discussion with a senior executive in an Egyptian 
construction company about the roles of those NGOs in developing social accounting prior 
to the Arab Spring, highlighted a number of interesting insights: 
They [NGOs] did not just offer partnerships for the Egyptian companies regarding their social 
projects or even how to report that ... those NGOs had power and contacts in and outside the industry 
... normally, companies would sense what was [politically] desirable and that was by following the 
activities of the [NGOs] (ES1, Egypt). 
The advent of NGOs introduced new skills for social accounting and also changed the habits 
and styles of social accounting communication [providing an image of the kind of world that 
social accounting exists in and supports]. For example, NGOs focused on the concept of 
social development. These new styles of reporting became incorporated in the companies’ 
new toolkit as they were clearly appreciated by the business community [... those NGOs have 
power and contacts]. This altered toolkit began to (re)construct different aspects of social 
accounting (i.e. strategies of action), in particular, placing greater emphasis on social 
involvement and corporate communication [... companies would sense what was desirable 
and that was by following the activities of these organisations]. Interestingly, at this stage the 
culture and context become rather too fused which made disentangling their influences on 
how strategies of action are constructed difficult (Swidler, 1986). Ideology adapted to 
pervade the different areas of social accounting, in such a way, as to provide or facilitate 
coherent “assumptions about what is true” (Swidler, 1986, p. 281). The following quote from 
a senior manager in Tunisia exemplifies the disentangling of culture and context in justifying 
the construction of new social involvements and communication, as well as the ideology that 
had gone underground and become widely accepted: 
Doing good is embedded within ourselves, and we are in a continuous search for new involvements 
that can move the society and ourselves forward ... these sometimes can be guided by organisations 
such as the United Nations... and the reason for this is that the bank [referring to his company] is 
more likely to achieve better outcomes in a harmonious society than in a broken and fragmented 
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one, so we have a belief that any investment in our society is a direct investment in our bank ... but 
we are restricted to our abilities and of course to what the system allows you to do (TS4, Tunisia). 
This demonstrates a new ideological approach to the construction of social accounting that 
faded into the background but worked to justify “what is true”. The discussion with TS4 
suggests that this new approach was influenced and shaped to different degrees by both 
context and culturally-shaped skills, habits and styles. Social involvements are motivated by 
cultural influences [... Doing good is embedded within ourselves...], whilst communication 
can either be shaped by the toolkit [... these sometimes can be guided by organisations such 
as the United Nations...], or constrained by it [... but we are restricted to our abilities and ... 
to what the system allows]. In such times, these adapted and faded ideologies become more 
encompassing to what is true than ideologies in open competition for alternative ways of 
organising experiences in social accounting (Swidler, 1986). Rather, they acted as a lens 
through which companies can appreciate the authority of habits and normality, thus 
explaining specific adaptations of strategies of action. During a discussion with a Tunisian 
executive officer about the influence of local political and economic power on their corporate 
communication, the inclusion of a portrait of the previous state president was highlighted: 
This was the way [referring to the inclusion of a portrait of the previous president] companies used 
to frame their external reports, ... if you look at other reports, corporate or non-corporate, I assure 
you, you would find the same framing style and the same “picture” ... I do not think these companies 
were forced to do so ... However, no one wanted to standout and not follow that reporting culture 
(TS2, Tunisia). 
In such a context, there is no search for new ways of organising [... no one wanted to standout 
and not follow that reporting culture], but rather accepting the undisputed authority of habits 
and normality in organising such areas [This was the way companies used to frame their 
external reports]. However, it is important to highlight that neither culture nor context impose 
a single unified pattern to organise such social accounting, in the sense of imposing norms 
and styles [... I do not think these companies were forced to do so]. Instead, such 
sociopolitical and economic context provides a limited set of cultural resources from which 
companies can construct their social accounting, constraining the scope of the strategies of 
action via restraining the available cultural resources to construct them. This observation 
arose out of our discussion with an executive director of an Egyptian company about what 
resources were available at a local level to construct their social accounts: 
We never had a localised reporting framework, although people sensed what locally were redlines 
not to be crossed ... thus companies, I believe, do their reporting based on global guidelines ... even 
social accounting specialists [hand signalled with quotation marks] borrowed more from the global 
practices than the local ones (ES4, Egypt). 
Companies constrained in their ability to construct social accounting practices such as 
communications [We never had a localised reporting framework...]. At the same time, certain 
resources became more central in this area [... thus companies, I believe, do their reporting 
based on global guidelines], and became rather invested in the meaning of the practice 
(Swidler, 1986). Therefore, global reporting guidelines anchored the communication 
function that companies developed before the Arab Spring event. The effectiveness of the 
adopted communications strategies was related to the toolkit of skills, habits and styles that 
were acquired by the Arab companies and senior managers. The different areas of social 
accounting were not only constructed through a toolkit shaped by socio-political and 
economic context, but were also supported by the political and economic positions that the 
P a g e  | 17 
 
company associated with. The significance of the political and economic positions of the 
company was highlighted through a discussion with a Jordanian senior manager who 
epitomised the role of the political regime: 
We have dealt with a number of social and environmental issues and we know there are plenty of 
matters to handle, ... so we work closely with the government and follow their vision ... for us the 
state is not just a partner that we work with but rather a leader of the social development ... and our 
social accounting strategy is stemmed from the state’s vision (JS3, Jordan). 
Influence of the political regime on the corporate behaviour is also evident from the following 
quote: 
Some companies were pushed to contribute to specific projects with specific NGOs, other companies 
proactively tried to establish connections with these NGOs ... may be for political gains sometimes 
... but at the end of the day, under the previous regime, a phone call from a person in the ruling elite 
is an order to adhere to (ES7, Egypt). 
Constructing social accounting prior to the Arab Spring required companies to have a 
distinctive toolkit of skills, habits and styles that reflected their political and economic 
positions in order to comprehend and navigate the surrounding political, economic and 
societal contexts [... may be for political gains sometimes] (ES7, Egypt). For instance, 
companies refined localised and political reporting skills and habits. This produced 
authoritarian reporting styles through which pre-Arab Spring political leaders and their 
strategies were portrayed as offering a moral compass. This distinctive toolkit allowed some 
leading Arab companies to begin effectively constructing a form of social accounting (see 
Table 4). We found that Islam, as an ideology, became influential in shaping engagement 
and communication with less powerful stakeholders (e.g. communities and employees). 
Some areas of social accounting remain less structured or what Swidler refers to as 
“uninstitutionalised”, allowing local and cultural effects to increasingly play a significant role 
in partly constructing sub-areas of social accounting. Talking with a company secretary in 
Morocco about social involvements and the explicit cultural materials, an implementation 
and engagement process was highlighted: 
We work in poor and deprived communities. Therefore, it is natural for us to engage in 
philanthropy... in such case, no consideration is given to any other aspects than principles and ethics 
... in order to engage with these communities and give them helping hands (MS2, Morocco). 
Constructing such sub-areas of social accounting rest on cultural assumptions of voluntary 
giving and philanthropy being influential within the community [... it is natural for us to 
engage in philanthropy]. Social involvement and stakeholder engagement persist, however, 
as what became the predominant and collective way of dealing with other aspects of social 
accounting that are not directly or indirectly taken care of by countries’ political and 
economic institutions. 
In short, different social accounting practices (NGOs relationships, stakeholder engagements, 
activities and communication) prior to the Arab Spring (i.e. settled context) required a toolkit 
of culturally and contextually-shaped skills, habits and styles. However, existing political ties 
among Arab companies further facilitated or in some cases, may have constrained the use of 
this toolkit (Matten and Moon, 2008; Dieleman and Boddewyn, 2012). Although the pre-
Arab Spring period can be characterised by “loose coupling” between culture and social 
accounting, culture remained essential in two areas; (1) in justifying the practices of social 
accounting to the company’s local stakeholders, and (2) in providing resources to deal with 
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unexpected issues, for improvising, in social accounting [6]. During this period, we have 
found that politically empowered NGOs contributed to shaping construction of the pre-Arab 
Spring social accounting by not only setting boundaries, but by also altering the companies’ 
toolkits to include new culturally sensitive skills and habits (i.e. focusing on social 
developments), and styles (i.e. global frameworks). These tacit and explicit cultural 
resources, however, were mobilised when the companies communicate and/implement social 
accounting practices at a local level. This was done through their loyalty and affinity with 
the “authoritarian” regimes. 
5.2 Social accounting in an unsettled context 
Everything has changed, the equation on the ground changed after 2011, “The leader’s disease” has 
vanished ... individuals and organisations were liberated from the hegemony of dictatorial power ... 
everyone had mixed feelings towards these changes, happy to get rid of the old regime and anxious 
about the new one. (EC3, Egypt) 
This is the picture of feelings after the Arab Spring drawn by an Egyptian academic. At this 
stage, significant changes took place within the Arab socio-political and economic contexts 
signalling a shift in political ideologies from autocracy towards a craving for democracy and 
plurality (Malik and Awadallah, 2013). What characterised the socio-political and economic 
context of the Arab region was altered after 2011 (i.e. loss/ changes in powerful individual 
and groups) [“[The] leader’s disease” has vanished ...]. The previous autocratic context 
supported, and to some extent shaped pre-Arab Spring social accounting practices. It is 
important to understand how Arab companies functioned in producing and organising social 
accounting practices after socio-political and economic disruption [... individuals and 
organisations were liberated from the hegemony of dictatorial power]. At the business level, 
such transformation seem to be perceived simultaneously with apprehension but also with 
welcoming attitudes [...we were prepared to work with whoever would be in power.] (TS2, 
Tunisia). We have also noted that companies did not immediately recognise the direct 
influences of these changes. Thus, the rest of this section is organised into (1) early unsettled 
context, and (2) late unsettled context. 
Early unsettled context: maintaining the old toolkit while engaging in practices of 
obfuscation 
The undisputed authority of habits and what was understood as normality of the previous 
regime and within social accounting appeared to be challenged at an early stage of the Arab 
Spring. Following Swidler’s assumption that there is “a continuum from ideology to tradition 
to common sense” (Swidler, 1986, p. 279), we argue that the pre-Arab Spring ideologies 
struggled to support normality during the post-Arab Spring period. Thus, pre-Arab Spring 
strategies of action fell short of being able to organise social accounting practices within this 
period of disruption. However, we noticed that there is a time gap between the dramatic 
changes that occurred in the socio-political and economic context, and the recognition of 
their influence on some social accounting practices. Interviewees provided a number of 
explanations for such a gap. They can be grouped into: (1) explanations around the pre-Arab 
Spring ties with a number of parties and (2) explanations that highlight the responsive nature 
of these practices. For example, an executive director of a Tunisian NGO stated the below: 
Social accounting practices in many large companies have become commitments and expectations 
towards foreign and local stakeholders, in one way you could look at them [the practices] as 
agreements between two or three parties: the companies being one of them ... another thing to 
remember is that these practices had been institutionalised before 2010 ... it cannot be changed 
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overnight, ... I know companies preferred to go into still mode to avoid any incoherent outcomes, 
except they could not ... they had obligations to meet (TC2, Tunisia). 
Different social accounting practices were undertaken under the settled context with space 
for refinements and improvements to create continuities in social accounting, rather than to 
be deconstructed and changed [... these practices had been institutionalised before 2010 ... it 
cannot be changed overnight]. Apprehending the difficulty of such changes, companies 
embarked on a justification process concerning the unchanged areas of social accounting by 
deploying a higher degree of explicit cultural material (e.g. philanthropy and voluntary giving 
tradition) (Swidler, 1986). Such processes began to distinguish between the pre-Arab 
Spring’s fused context and culture. The quote below portrays how Arab companies dealt with 
the changes: 
We did not do anything wrong before 2010 ... we were a proactive company that accomplished great 
projects ... winning awards ... of course like others we worked with those who are now considered 
as dictators... keeping our operations and people in employment, the last thing we needed was to 
enter the political conflicts ... but we were prepared to work with whoever would be in power (TS2, 
Tunisia). 
This company attempted to create a disconnect between (1) what practices they engaged in, 
associated to its explicit culture [... that accomplished great projects ...], and (2) how they 
adapted such practices, in the pre-Arab Spring context [... as others we worked with those 
who are considered now as dictators...]. By doing this, companies tried to justify relying on 
preArab Spring ways of doing things, whilst avoiding a process that deconstructed these 
approaches and instead initiated a search for new ones. At the same time, companies appeared 
to recognise how powerful the resulting socio-political and economic contextual changes 
were, but without a good understanding of how these changes were, or could be, 
accommodated by social accounting practices. This was highlighted in a number of 
interviews, for example an executive director of an Egyptian company stated: 
We have been communicating our values, visions and responsibilities to our stakeholders via 
corporate reports including social reports ... based on hard work and our societal involvements ... 
but the Egyptian revolution added a new dimension to everything, everyone needed to re-think this 
new dimension (ES4, Egypt). 
Recognising these powerful changes [...the Egyptian revolution added a new dimension to 
everything ...] puts the old strategies of action in a critical position for re-evaluation, 
particularly the corporate communication function of social accounting. Following Swidler 
(1986) we argue that, in such a period, companies instigate new ways to organise their 
practices through adapting “unfamiliar habits” until they become familiar. However, our 
interviews showed that companies behaved in different ways during this period, influenced 
by their political and economic ties with previous Arab regimes. These ways ranged from (1) 
keeping the social accounting communications to a minimum and (2) adapting unfamiliar 
habits in making a space for new corporate political discourse. The following quote is an 
example of minimal communication that was given by a deputy director of an Egyptian NGO 
with regards to company X’, one of the largest companies in the world. The company’s CEO 
was a significant member of the previous regime and after the Arab Spring he faced serious 
corruption charges and hefty fines, whilst the company’s share price was plummeting: 
Company X was completely silent ... their communications were minimal during the period when 
their CEO was facing corruption charges ... I think that’s normal, the trust was broken ... no one 
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would believe an advertisement on TV or a social report from this company ... also they were a very 
attractive topic for the media to talk about at that time (EC5, Egypt). 
Production of social reports assuming as if nothing happened would have produced 
undesirable outcomes [... no one would believe an advertisement on TV or a social report 
from this company]. However, others, with similar ties to the previous Arab ruling elites, 
turned to their corporate communications including social reporting to provide a 
disconnection with the previous political and economic context. This is what Swidler (1986, 
p. 279) refers to as “unfamiliar habits” (see Table 4), which may not require new skills to do 
so. Often these reporting actions were used to demonstrate support for the changes, socio-
political shifts and against the prior regimes. Discussing the use of visual media and narrative 
in social reporting (Usmani et al., 2020; Davison, 2007) to express the company’s political 
stance after the Arab Spring, the executive director at the Egyptian company tried to explain 
this use of images and narrative below: 
In the report you [the interviewer] refer to, ... the picture presenting our employees and others is 
there because we are proud of it ... I was there ... asking for freedom and change ... and it is not just 
a picture, it meant a lot to us ... we wanted the report to reflect the revolution ... the report also 
included the revolution’s slogans (ES1, Egypt). 
This may represent a change in the area of social accounting communication [we wanted the 
report to reflect the revolution ...]. This change, however, did not require the acquisition of 
new skills. For Swidler, such changes contribute to new cultural models [7] [supporting 
revolution and cries for democracy rather than dictatorship] that play influential roles in 
organising social life, even though it may seem symbolic rather than genuine (Swidler, 1986). 
However, other companies struggled to accept that the old ideologies (pre-Arab Spring) had 
become contested and unable to create, or fake, normality. For example, some companies 
interviewed reacted negatively ... avoiding the expression of a concern for the Arab Spring 
and its consequences in their reporting. An Egyptian executive director of one these 
companies provided an explanation of the links between the company and the previous 
political regime, whilst commenting on one of their major shareholders who is a relative of 
the ousted Egyptian president: 
... Yes, he is [a relative of the ousted president] ... but this company also represents thousands of 
shareholders, employees and clients who belong to the wider society ... but pessimistic critics would 
look at the empty half of the cup and forget our other contributions (ES2, Egypt). 
This signifies how the old ideologies that were influential in the pre-Arab Spring strategies 
of action became negatively perceived [... people would look at the empty half of the cup ...]. 
This did not immediately lead to the replacement of the existing strategies of action. This 
may be seen as due in part, to the situated nature of these corporate practices (Swidler, 1986). 
However, socio-political and economic changes gave the companies the scope to express 
their political stances around the Arab Spring and its consequences in different ways. This 
suggests a new way of thinking about the relationship between companies and the wider 
socio-political and economic context, as suggested by a Tunisian executive: 
Firms will not be able to make decisions regarding their financial and non-financial activities in 
isolation any longer ... this new era placed the Arab firms and their activities under social scrutiny 
and evaluation. (TS2, Tunisia). 
The dominant opinion among interviewed managers was that social accounting offered a 
substantial channel for communication with and representation to the people who were 
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demanding changes. They claimed that businesses and institutions alike had been both 
liberalised and liberated from the hegemonic role of the prior political regimes. At the same 
time, Arab firms had to establish new connections with the people, different stakeholders and 
society after a long period of relative disengagement. This suggests that those companies, 
which were subjected to a chronic state of “unsettledness”, in particular companies 
stigmatised by associations with the previous regimes, were more likely to need explicit 
strategies of action to guide their social accounting practices (Swidler, 1986). 
Late unsettled context: time for new strategies of action and revision of the old toolkit 
... We cannot keep telling people to enjoy music and art, whilst half of our youth population is out 
of work ... if we continue to do this, the region will be in another crisis soon. (TS4, Tunisia). 
Here the interviewee refers to the pre-Arab Spring social programmes, which companies had 
engaged in, signifying shifts in the way they perceived such programmes in the post-Arab 
Spring context, suggesting the emergence of a new cultural model. The pre-Arab Spring 
ideology (being loyal to the ruling elite) had become contested and unable to produce 
normality after the Arab Spring. As a consequence, companies began searching for new 
strategies of action, having accepted that the old strategies produce practices that no longer 
fit with the new socio-political and economic environment [We cannot keep telling the 
people to enjoy music and art]. Although the vast majority of the interviewees mentioned 
new ways and methods of conducting social accounting after the Arab Spring, they also 
referred to a process in which old ways and methods were reassessed. For instance, an 
executive director for a Tunisian company showed the significance of this perspective despite 
the financial pressures on companies during this particular period. She stated that: 
This revolution was a financial crisis for us and the whole economy ... we had major losses and 
projected further losses, but that did not stop us from getting involved ... and help out as we needed 
... a number of new projects were established and we reviewed the on-going ones (TS2, Tunisia). 
Despite signifying prohibitive reasons, including costs, for engaging in such changes [This 
revolution was a financial crisis for us and the whole economy...], companies appeared to 
selfconsciously look for new activities to get involved with [... a number of new projects 
were established and we reviewed the on-going ones]. The interviews show that companies 
actively engaged in searching for new ways and methods to construct NGOs’ partnerships, 
stakeholder engagement strategies, social engagements and social accounting 
communication. This search was stimulated by the post-Arab Spring political and religious 
environment or, in Swidler’s words, the adoption of alternative ideologies (Swidler, 1986). 
For instance, rather than exchanging political and economic influences, post-Arab Spring’s 
partnerships between companies and NGOs appeared to focus on basic skills and knowledge 
exchange (i.e. a largely economic approach). The following quote exemplifies this: 
NGOs on the ground had to react rather swiftly to the on-going aggravating human crisis ... a number 
of projects and centres in a short period of time... were opened and were operating ... these projects 
and others were supported by personal contacts. (EC5, Egypt) 
This illustrates how these adapted approaches (e.g. feelings of responsibility towards social 
and human crises) became influential in a newly contested cultural/social arena, even though 
they remained unable to provide complete justification for their social accounting practices 
(Swidler, 1986). The constraints on such ideological movements stemmed from the sense 
that much of their taken-for-granted understanding of social accounting still depended on 
pre-Arab Spring skills, habits and styles such as building support [these projects and others 
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were supported by personal contacts]. This may explain why companies began to pay more 
attention to their NGO partnerships. The interviews showed how social accounting practice 
took a different direction by reporting in greater details on outsourced programmes, 
establishing spending reviews, cash flow and timeframe adjustments. A number of 
companies became more fully engaged in the operational phase of social accounting activity, 
whereas prior to the Arab Spring companies had to strictly comply with requests for charity 
projects specified by the ruling elites and their favoured NGOs. 
The adapted cultural model post-Arab Spring made explicit demands in contested arenas like 
stakeholder engagement. Many companies found an alternative in employee initiatives for 
different types of stakeholder engagement. The skills, habits and styles that shaped the ways 
companies dealt with this area of social accounting altered as the role of employees shifted 
from being passive operational contributors to taking a much more proactive role where they 
would organise actions appropriate to the new conditions (see Table 4, under stakeholder 
engagement, row 3). A senior manager claimed that his company had to fully operate/account 
for a number of programmes that were proposed by junior and middle managements, who 
showed enthusiasm and ability to operate and manage these programmes. This is exemplified 
in the following quote: 
Our employees have been socially active, particularly after the January revolution... we have been 
running and supporting a number of projects that were started by them ... such as “cycling for 
refugees” and other projects that aim to raise awareness of issues we are facing (ES5, Egypt). 
Such ways and methods of organising social practices were unfamiliar and unbudgeted for 
in the Arab companies we interviewed. The post-Arab Spring forms a “high-ideology” 
period, where numerous unfamiliar ways and approaches emerge organically in order to 
organise practices and restructure organisations (Swidler, 1986, p. 280). In this context, 
companies began to revise and review their toolkits of skills, habits and styles, acquiring 
unfamiliar tools to construct appropriate post-Arab Spring social accounting, which later 
become policy– symbolic, and customary. Our interviews show that companies began to 
deploy new ways and methods to organise and measure their new social engagements. They 
often focused on satisfying the basic needs of the people for shelter and food. At the same 
time, these companies were searching for new mechanisms to fund post-Arab Spring social 
engagements, while suffering from significant financial losses. One mechanism consisted of 
shifting financial resources from marketing and advertising departments towards the social 
activities budget. The following quote highlights this: 
Companies are not economic ventures anymore, aiming to produce the highest net profit figure, in 
particular in the Arab region and the Arab Spring ... no one could work in isolation to the issues 
around us ... in the last five years, we have shifted a significant portion of the marketing and 
advertising budget toward our social activities. (JS1, Jordan) 
This comment reflects an ideological shift [Companies are not economic ventures 
anymore...] and was adapted to organise and produce social accounting practices. Further, 
such movement plays a powerful role in organising ways to create these practices [... we have 
shifted a significant portion of the marketing and advertising budget toward our social 
activities.]. Discussing this shift with a director of a Jordanian consultancy, he described the 
example of a Jordanian company that appeared to shift its thinking after the Arab Spring, 
stating: 
Before 2010, wherever you turned your head in Amman, you would see an advertisement for 
company Y... this is not the case anymore, I have not seen any advertisements for this company for 
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a while ... but when I go to their HQ now, I feel as if I have entered a social and environmental 
centre, ... we work with them on a significant number of projects, especially the youth projects (JC3, 
Jordan). 
Contrasting the pre-Arab Spring (settled context) ideologies, the post-Arab Spring 
ideological movements are in active competition with other frameworks and alternative 
ideologies (Swidler, 1986). Thus, it becomes interesting to understand how a particular 
ideology is adapted. This can be reflected in the altered and adapted toolkits in the post-Arab 
Spring period, which supported the construction of alternative social reporting. The vast 
majority of the interviewed Arab companies had been following GRI guidelines for reporting 
purposes and were framing their social accounting disclosures within internationally 
recognised frameworks. Now the Arab Spring was raising questions around the effectiveness 
of these global guidelines in accommodating revolutionary changes or major crises, such as 
those produced by a global pandemic, while satisfying the expectations of newly empowered 
stakeholders. Osman et al. (2020) refers to this as the “emancipatory” potential of social 
accounting, which he argues, is missed by these so-called global standards. Similar concerns 
are raised by Belal and Owen (2007) around the applicability of international social 
accounting standards in the Bangladeshi context. A Tunisian financial director, who had a 
direct involvement in implementing GRI guideline in his company, highlighted the strengths 
and weaknesses of these guidelines in line with the post-Arab Spring context: 
No one can deny that, after 2010, we entered a crisis of trust ... communications where the crisis is 
and its solution ... It was easy for companies to repeat what they were communicating before 2010. 
using global guidelines as it may look safe, ... but this may have done more harm than good... 
communicating with the new strong voice in the Tunisian street may seem difficult but was required 
where global guidelines would not help. (TS1, Tunisia) 
The chronically “unsettled” nature of the post-Arab Spring context increased the demand for 
new strategies of action to produce and organise the changed focus of social accounting 
(Swidler, 1986) to guide the post-Arab Spring reporting [... communicating with the new 
strong voice in the Tunisian street may seem difficult but was much required ...]. For instance, 
a company released a pre-Arab Spring style social account, which included photos of senior 
managers handing over blankets and clothes to Syrian refugees. This was perceived by many 
as potentially humiliating and disrespectful to refugees and an inappropriate use of media. 
As a consequence a social media campaign was run to boycott the company and the same 
photo from the report was re-used in social media to support the grass roots campaign, and 
to protest the company’s disrespectful behaviour. Such sentiments are evident in the response 
of the following NGO interviewee: 
... the Facebook campaign targeted the company’s economic activities ... this was triggered by the 
miscommunication of a social activity ... this was a powerful incident, which awakened the 
companies to a new reality. (JC5, Jordan) 
In this instance, the development, expression and attempt to “logically” adopt new strategies 
of action was made clear as companies faced growing pressure to achieve both a high degree 
of societal acceptance while re-designing reporting methods to fit with Islamic and Arab 
norms. Informing society and stakeholders about their corporate programmes and activities 
became a somewhat more complex and sensitive process. The following quote from a senior 
Tunisian manager exemplifies this: 
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Everyone, including companies, had to unlearn whatever they learnt before 2010 ... even the way 
we talked because the ultimate new goal now is to satisfy the Arab street [people] instead of 
satisfying its elite (TS1, Tunisia). 
One of the underlying drivers of the above shift in sensitivity mirrors changes in the social 
environment and the desires of newly empowered stakeholders [... [our] new goal now is to 
satisfy the Arab street ...]. The above shift is a clear illustration of the “emancipatory” 
potential of social accounting noted in Osman et al. (2020). This results from a division in 
the region between (1) the majority who demonstrated for change and (2) the minority elite 
group who had links with the previous political regimes, which was brought into stark relief 
by the Arab Spring. The former group sought to claim authority over the elite group, who 
were suspected of maintaining continuing relationships, economic and personal ties with the 
ousted leaders. Arab companies sought to show an acceptance of this issue in their corporate 
communications, arguing that the economic and social roles played by them post-Arab 
Spring demonstrated robust ties to society. Companies have also recognised the significance 
of reviewing what they can do and how they can do it (the toolkit of skills, habits and styles), 
through which they navigate new ways and methods (i.e. strategies of action). This adapted 
toolkit facilitates the construction of authentic post-Arab Spring social accountings, which 
address issues that resulted from or were revealed following the Arab Spring in order to 
achieve societal approval and boost societal involvements. 
A greater recourse to explicit cultural material was deployed in post-Arab Spring social 
accounting in order to offer justifications for and align corporate behaviour more closely with 
local community concerns. This is where the sociology literature suggests that contextual 
elements could enhance the framing exercise as a persuasive social practice, moving away 
from the idea of ideological motivation (Swidler, 1986). Despite the fact that social 
accounting in the region has been institutionalised to some extent (Jamali et al., 2015), 
individual companies utilise specific contextual elements (economic, ethical and religious) 
to obtain social and economic acceptance from targeted stakeholders’ groups such as political 
regimes, shareholders and communities. Companies can produce and organise more 
acceptable alignments towards adaptation to the changes. This can be manifested via 
emphasising benefits or provide neutral interpretations that portrays acceptance of the 
changes. 
6. Discussion 
The evidence presented above shows how strategies of action lead to the creation and 
organisation of new social accounting practices. We identify four areas of social accounting: 
NGO partnerships, social involvement, stakeholder engagement and corporate 
communication. We find that strategies of action develop over time. In the long term, these 
companies create continuities in their social accounting that come to reflect their styles and 
ethos. 
In regard to unsettled context [post-Arab Spring], our study argues that at the beginning the 
companies tried to partially rely on their pre-Arab Spring strategies of action to produce and 
organise their social accounting practices whilst promoting a strong emphasis on explicit 
cultural materials to justify this reliance. At a later stage of the unsettled period, companies 
realise the need to search for new strategies of action that better suited the changing 
environment. In making these more significant changes to their strategies of action, 
companies attempted to identify new styles and habits towards social accounting whilst also 
trying to develop new skills that could be used to create and organise the readjusted social 
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accounting. This shows how the context and its instability largely [im]mobilised the search 
for new cultural models in the unsettled period. The new range of skills, styles and habits 
extended the different practices of social accounting to help identify: (1) responsibility 
towards social and human crises such as the Syrian refugee crisis and charity work, (2) 
recognising in-house talents and employee-led initiatives, (3) increasingly going beyond 
purely economic concerns and (4) becoming more sensitive to the complexity of social 
accounting. We argue these styles and habits stemmed from the wider post-Arab Spring 
adapted ideologies (i.e. highly organised meaning systems) that were based on religious 
views (i.e. Islam) and post-Arab Spring political visions of freedom and democracy. 
We claim a number of empirical and theoretical contributions to the social accounting 
literature. First, our examination of social accounting in a relatively under-researched but 
very rich context of Arab spring enables us to provide new empirical insights which includes 
reporting of bottom-up employee led initiatives, social reporting’s perceived pointlessness 
due to broken trust, danger of reporting which are inconsistent with social norms and 
expectations (e.g. incidence of reporting on Syrian refugees) and the findings related to “one 
leader disease”. Some of these findings are further discussed below as part of our elaborations 
on theoretical contributions. These findings stand in contrast with the earlier work in the 
social accounting literature (see for e.g. Campbell, 2000; Cho, 2009; Strand, 2013). Within a 
legitimacy framing, this strand of literature suggests that social and environmental 
disclosures can be used as a powerful tool to maintain and restore legitimacy and trust in 
companies in times of corporate crises. We however argue that, in an unsettled socio-political 
and economic context, these disclosures might be perceived as irrelevant by the stakeholders 
or inappropriate and may result in a backlash against the organisations that adopt them. 
Second, we draw on the work of Swidler (1986) to explore how companies use social 
accounting as strategies of action to produce and organise practices that fit and suit different 
contexts. In doing so, we respond to the call to explore previously untried theoretical 
frameworks to inform the analysis of how social accounts are produced (Unerman and 
Chapman, 2014). Our analysis suggests that strategies of action were used in the pre-Arab 
Spring period [i.e. settled context] by focusing on skills, habits and styles that complemented 
the companies’ political and economic positions within broadly authoritarian regimes. This 
enabled these organisations to comprehend and navigate the surrounding political, economic 
and societal contexts, thus producing and organising contextually acceptable social 
accounting practices (Swidler, 1986; see also Kamla 2007; Kamla et al., 2012; Jamali and 
Mirshak, 2007). These authors suggested that social accounting is shaped by the local 
economic and political contexts, whilst businesses constructed their planning, objectives and 
decisions based upon local religious and political settings. Our findings echo Karam and 
Jamali (2013), who suggest that the post-Arab Spring context produced fertile ground for 
changes in practices throughout the local environment. We note that changes in the social 
accounting areas that we have examined are not sudden and discrete, but often shift gradually 
from prior habits and styles during the Arab Spring period (Karam and Jamali, 2013; Avina, 
2013). We found a reliance on the pre-Arab Spring approach of insensitive promotion of 
charity work, such as distribution of clothing and other help to poor communities without 
respecting privacy from various forms of corporate and social media. This incident and 
others, which were produced and organised via the old pre-Arab Spring strategies of action, 
caused serious reputational damage to the companies involved. While an act of charity for 
humanitarian reasons is encouraging, the tendency to use it for promotional reasons was 
resented. It went against the flourishing meaning systems, the religious (Islam) and the post-
Arab Spring political views (Kamla et al., 2012; Karam and Jamali, 2013; Osman et al., 
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2020). This was perceived in Karam and Jamali’s (2013) study as indications of instability in 
local contexts, causing the deinstitutionalisation of some social accounting practices. The 
resulting instability created dramatic changes in the local contextual elements that influenced 
various configurations of the cultural toolkit facing companies destabilising their prior 
strategies of action (Swidler, 1986). 
Third, we shed light on the pre-existing highly organised and local meaning systems and their 
roles in shaping and forming new strategies of action. Swidler (1986) argues that, in its 
chronic state ... unsettledness provokes an urge for new and explicit strategies of action. We 
observe how this impacted on company efforts to identify new skills, habits and styles to 
update their social accounting practices. We note that this was especially clear in companies 
that were stigmatised for their association with the old regimes. We report stakeholders 
observed several companies becoming silent about their social involvements. Such instability 
in the wider socio-political and economic contexts creates a hostile environment for some 
social disclosures, (cf. Cho, 2009; Patten, 1992). At this phase of the Arab Spring and 
unsettled context, new strategies of action were stimulated by what Swidler identifies as 
“high-ideology” (Islamic and revolution visions of freedom and democracy). Kamla et al. 
(2006) argue that Islam (i.e. an organised meaning system) is able to provide ways and 
methods of better practicing social accounting in the context where influential decision-
makers within the new Arab political and economic regimes did not desire the 
implementation of western principles and standards. These highly organised meaning 
systems (or ideologies) were often suppressed under the settled context. In the post-Arab 
Spring period, companies sought to restore the adequacy of their social accounting by 
reflecting the idea that their strategies of action were informed and shaped by an ideology 
that has comprehensive, highly constructed cognitive and normative patterns (Swidler, 1986), 
such as religious and community values. 
Fourth, our use of CTT helped us explain how companies respond to contextual changes by 
having different configurations of cultural tools at their disposal. Employing the CTT is also 
worthwhile as it acknowledges contextual heterogeneity and places the firms and their 
managers in agentic control of the materials they can use to inform their understanding and 
practices (Swidler, 1986). In this study, we have found evidence of social accounting 
practices to be led by a bottom-up approach, especially in the unsettled period. This replaced 
a period in which top managements’ role in the initiation and development of social 
accounting was more critical (see for e.g. Campbell, 2000; Strand, 2013). These post-Arab 
Spring ways of organising and producing such practices appeared to be initiated by a desire 
to achieve an “emancipatory focus” (Osman et al., 2020) for social accounting that would 
speak to the “Arab street”. In this sense, the CTT provides an understanding of how 
companies utilise and configure specific cultural tools to influence links with stakeholders’ 
groups who could provide both approval and access to resources within a socio-political and 
economic context. Through the available ideologies, companies seek to create orientations 
towards change by emphasising benefits or at times remain neutral to present an image to 
stakeholders. This can be exemplified in the ways companies used portraits of political 
leaders in corporate reports ... the “repressive” potential of social accounting (Osman et al., 
2020). This is an acute example of the “one leader disease” that one of our interviewees 
referred to in Section 5.1 of this paper. However, in the post-Arab Spring context, pages in 
corporate reports carrying the portrait of political leaders were quickly replaced either by an 
empty page as a symbolic protest or doing away with any symbolic links to the old regime. 
As some of our interviewees note, such departures from old reporting habits and ways or 
organising took some time in some firms, but as changes were made they often reflected 
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protests from the Arab Street. The companies had to unfamiliarise themselves with new styles 
and habits (e.g. working on refugees and human crises, developing brand-new projects, 
dealing with new stakeholders and revising their social accounting communications) to 
reflect newly adapted styles in their social accounting. This adoption of new styles and habits 
required companies to learn new skills, whilst refining or forgetting old ones (e.g. skills that 
were concerned with NGOs or a regime based focus on stakeholder engagement). 
7. Concluding remarks 
Recent debates in the social accounting literature concerning developing nations underline 
the relative lack of attention to the collection of rich contextual information of these countries 
(Belal et al., 2013; Islam and Deegan, 2008; Tilt, 2016; Karam and Jamali, 2013). Our aim 
has been to explore how social accounting operates in the context of profound political, social 
and economic crises. The literature retains a sense of the possibility of socially impactful 
research around the issues and challenges in the socio-political environment (Belal and 
Cooper, 2011; Momin and Parker, 2013; Belal et al., 2015; Yang et al., 2015; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2005; Kuasirikun, 2005; Lauwo et al., 2016; Thoradeniya et al., 2015). There is also 
a call for relatively untried or novel theoretical and conceptual framings (Unerman and 
Chapman, 2014). Our paper explicitly incorporates contextual information from an under-
researched environment of severe upheaval while also seeking to provide diversity in 
theoretical framing. For the first time in the accounting literature, we use Swidler’s (1986) 
CTT frame to explore how companies under different settings can develop ways of 
organising and producing social accounting practices in the light of changing socio-political 
and economic contexts. We frame social accounting as “strategies of action” (Swidler, 1986) 
comprising of different configurations to the culture “toolkit” of habits, skills and styles, 
which are then shaped by such contexts. 
In conclusion, our study has explored social accounting practices in 17 Arab companies prior 
to and after the Arab Spring. The choice of the Arab Spring as a key contextual setting has 
provided insights for understanding how and why relevant strategies of action are constructed 
and implemented under different contexts (i.e. settled and unsettled context) using different 
configurations of cultural toolkit (Swidler, 1986). We show that culture holds power to bridge 
gaps caused by the instability of the surrounding socio-political and economic context, whilst 
companies are sufficiently aware or agile. The world at large and individual countries 
appeared to be in a loop of continuous political and economic changes, forced either by social 
and political movements such as the Arab Spring or by the 2020 pandemic (i.e. COVID-19). 
We suggest that culture provides a toolkit of habits, skills and styles. During periods of 
significant change, sociopolitically aware companies and institutions may be able to 
recognise and use cultural changes to construct contextually appropriate strategies of action. 
Given the sensitive socio-political and economic nature of the Arab Spring and the difference 
of opinions around the notion of the Arab Spring, we argue that our understanding is still 
limited regarding external stakeholders’ perceptions and the way Arab companies are 
perceived. Therefore, more studies are encouraged to enhance our understanding of 
contextual elements and complexities of corporate behaviour in relation to producing and 
organising social accounting practices. Further, research may be carried out to examine social 
accounting and its practices under different upheaval contexts (e.g. regions or countries such 
as Syria or Zambia) in order to investigate the influences of different contextual elements on 
constructing social accounting related strategies of action. Finally, we would like to 
encourage future researchers to undertake social and environmental accounting studies on 
developing countries with more innovative contextual and theoretical frames. 
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Notes 
1. For Swidler, culture is the boundaries of human cognition, formed through socio-political and 
economic surroundings of an actor and/or human institution, rather than systems of values that have 
to be internalised by social agents. Swidler’s “echolocation” example illustrates how culture is used 
by social agents, “...cultural imagery is used somewhat the way bats use the walls of caves for 
echolocation. Bats know where they are by bouncing sounds off the objects around them. Similarly, 
people orient themselves partly by bouncing their ideas off the cultural alternatives made apparent 
in their environments” (Swidler, 2003, p. 30). 
2. For Swidler, strategy is a broad way of trying to organise a particular part of life. Swidler gives the 
following example to illustrate what she means by strategy: “trying, for example, to secure position 
by allying with prestigious families through marriage” (Swidler, 1986, p. 276). 
3. We use these two notions of settled and unsettled context from Swidler (1986) and apply them in 
the Arab Spring context. While doing so we acknowledge that this dichotomous understanding could 
be limited. Although the pre-Arab Spring state may not look particularly settled, it entailed a fairly 
stable and consistent political and economic regimes which had endured in broadly the same shape 
for more than 40 years, which was in our view relatively settled compared to the chaos and upheaval 
that occurred during the Arab Spring. 
4. Although the idea of strategies is central to our study, we perceive the term strategy, following 
Swidler (1986), from an unconventional angle (see, footnote 2). We use the term in the sense of 
broad ways of organising corporate practices while examining how these ways unfold and alter over 
time. This allows us to provide an understanding of cultural and contextual meaning in the context 
of constructing these strategies. 
5. Our contextual focus is on the MENA region that experienced the Arab Spring event between 2010 
and 2011. This region provides a distinct tapestry. Whilst these countries vary on several dimensions 
(e.g. size, resources and policy), they share other features such as one dominant language and 
history, and to a significant extent similar socio-political landscapes. Rather than downplaying the 
importance of these, we contend that a wider view offers rich insights. 
6. These are the habits, skills and styles around Arabic and Islamic symbols, stories, rituals and 
worldviews. These can be religious beliefs, family, Arabic traditions and thinking, greeting and 
gestures, and hospitality and visits. 
7. Swidler suggests that “cultural models, such as ideologies, play a powerful role in organizing social 
life” (Swidler, 1986, p. 278). An ideology, in this sense, can be perceived as a phase in the 
development of these cultural models. 
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